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Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family:
The American Law Institute’s
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
James Herbie DiFonzo∗
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONSOLIDATION OF FAMILY LAW
The American Law Institute (“ALI”) recently approved the
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations (the “Family Dissolution Principles” or “Principles”), proposing a wide range of regulations for the legal termination of domestic
unions.1 These standards and rules apply to traditional divorce actions between wives and husbands, as well as in proceedings stemming from the dissolution of nonmarital domestic partnerships. The
task of bringing coherence and consistency to family law is truly
daunting. Traditional domestic relations jurisprudence, confronted
with the brisk pace of cultural and technological change, has resulted
in such startling and uneven change to the legal landscape that the
ALI’s most well-known product, a Restatement, is unthinkable. It
will prove difficult enough to agree whether the Principles have
properly described the present shape and tendencies of the emerging

∗ Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School. J.D., M.A., 1977, Ph.D. 1993,
University of Virginia. E-mail: lawjhd@hofstra.edu. This article was made possible by a summer
research grant from Hofstra University. My thanks to John DeWitt Gregory, Linda McClain,
Ruth Stern, Tricia Kasting, and Angel Aton for their generous assistance with research and arguments. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Family
Dissolution Principles, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Feb. 1, 2001.
The revised article has also benefited from comments made by other panelists at the symposium. Finally, I wish to thank Lynn Wardle for his graciousness and support.
1. At its Annual Meeting in May 2000, the ALI gave final approval to the entire
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, as
contained in Proposed Final Draft, pt. I (Feb. 14, 1997); Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I (Mar. 20,
1998); Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. II (Apr. 8, 1998); and Tentative Draft No. 4 (Apr. 10,
2000). The whole work will be integrated into a coherent final text, and is expected to be published in 2001. Unless otherwise specified, all references to sections of the Principles cited
herein will be to the most recent draft. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4)].
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legal constructs in the field.2 This article provides an early assessment
of the Principles’ efforts both to reflect and reframe family dissolution law.
In several areas, the Principles summarize the majority view; in
others, they craft a model statute.3 The Family Dissolution Principles
thus constitute the latest embodiment of a recurring tension in the
ALI between its aim to harmonize the diversity of extant laws and an
equal focus on the “better adaptation [of the law] to social needs.”4
These conflicts arise regularly over the concept of a Restatement.5
The Principles’ “bold attempt”6 to redefine and bring uniformity to
the consequences of dissolution will prove no less controversial.7

2. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I Feb. 14, 1997),
at xiii [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I)] (“The idea of Principles gives
greater weight to emerging legal concepts than does a Restatement. Given the current disarray
in family law—the unparalleled volume of litigation and legislation—this approach seems more
appropriate.”).
3. See J. Thomas Oldham, ALI Principles of Family Dissolution: Some Comments, 1997
U. ILL. L. REV. 801, 802 (observing that while the property proposals generally constitute a
restatement of prevailing law, the spousal support recommendations often stake out new
ground).
4. AM. LAW INST., Certificate of Incorporation, reprinted in 74 A.L.I. PROC. 517
(1997); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The American Law Institute Is Alive and Well, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 661, 665 (1998) (noting that harmonization of extant legal principles is
part of the raison d’être of the ALI).
5. See Charles W. Wolfram, Bismarck’s Sausages and the ALI’s Restatements, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 818 (1998) (“[T]he ALI perennially witnesses struggles over the concept of a Restatement.”).
6. Oldham, supra note 3, at 802; see also CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F.
BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW 107 (2000) (“The ALI Principles are ambitious and
range even more broadly than the [Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act].”).
7. Few fields are legitimately as rife as family law for intellectual disputation. After all,
“there is no consensus even as to what family law is,” and basic issues abound as to the proper
composition of the family itself. Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy,
Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 269 (2000). See Jane
C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality
in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1112–15 (1999) (discussing different scholarly
views on the construction of families). The ALI Principles have already generated adverse
comment. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties
and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 783, 783 n.2 (1999) (criticizing the ALI for “utterly refus[ing]” to consider the divorce counterrevolution seeking to roll back the excesses of nofault divorce by altering the grounds and methods for obtaining dissolution); Oldham, supra
note 3, at 802–14 (criticizing several provisions of the ALI Principles). See generally Julie
Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the New ALI Principles, 35
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 769 (1999) (criticizing the limited scope of the ALI de facto parent
provision).
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Unified Field Theory of the Family

This article discusses the overarching, if unarticulated, premise of the
Family Dissolution Principles. Fundamentally, the Principles conceive
of family law as entering a consolidation phase, in which scattershot
judicial discretion is displaced by delimiting rules.8 In an effort to ensure the success of this consolidation, the ALI has blueprinted an architectonic design in the construction of the rules of domestic dissolution. This new legal structure showcases three features. First, the
generative entities of family law, parents and other domestic unions,
are undergoing a utilitarian metamorphosis. Parenthood is in the
process of discarding its biological chrysalis and emerging in a more
functional form. Second, the financial aftershocks of marital dissolution, traditionally termed alimony (or maintenance) and property division, have virtually melded into one integrated financial schema
governing all domestic fractures. Third, despite the ongoing societal
reconsideration of the ease of divorce, the ALI Principles exclude
consideration of fault or any other dissolution-delaying mechanism.
Considered together, these features fuse to form the backbone of a
unified field theory of the family, one whose unspoken aim is finally
to consolidate the no-fault divorce revolution.9
The substitution of discrete rules for the “largely limitless discretion . . . common in family law”10 sounds a leitmotif throughout the
Principles, and it serves to leverage the drive toward the unification
8. In a sense, the ALI proposals may also be seen as responding to scholarly plaints that
“[f]amily law has always been longer on practice than on theory.” Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social
Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 489 (1983).
9. This article examines the central concerns of the ALI Principles. Certain aspects of
the Principles receive only cursory consideration herein, including the changed calculus of child
support (ch. 3), the increased role of private agreements in family law (ch. 7), and the practical
equivalence of domestic partnerships to marriages (ch. 6). These provisions also reflect the
overall themes of the Principles. Briefly noted, the ALI child support provisions advance the
trend substituting discrete guidelines for broad discretion. The increased role afforded couples’
agreements enhances private ordering as another tool to further diminish the scope of judicial
review, and the domestic partnership provisions promote the aim of theoretical consolidation
by establishing default rules which mimic the law’s treatment of marital dissolution.
10. Ira Mark Ellman, Brigitte M. Bodenheimer Memorial Lecture on the Family: Inventing Family Law, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 871 (1999). See Murphy, supra note 7, at 1197
(“Standards in family law for allocating family assets, deciding child custody and visitation,
child support and alimony have traditionally been characterized by broad discretion.”); Mary
Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60
TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1986) (“Family law . . . is characterized by more discretion than
any other field of private law.”). A nuanced summary of the conflicting claims of rules and of
discretion in family law is provided in Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in Family Law: A Report and Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1993).
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of family law. The attack on the excessive leeway afforded domestic
relations courts is itself not new. As Chief Reporter Ira Ellman has
noted, “over the past three decades, one theme that emerges is the
movement from broad judicial discretion toward more certain rules
of adjudication.”11 The nationwide adoption of child support guidelines provides the clearest example of this trend, both consolidating
and increasing child support enforcement.12
However, the Principles do not merely attempt to further attenuate the scope of judicial authority; rather, they trumpet a finale to
most forms of traditional judicial discretion. The sharp shrinking of
the scope of discretion is essential to the consolidation and rationalization of the rules for dissolution. In their contemporary crusade to
“[i]nvent[] [f]amily [l]aw,”13 the ALI reformers must have realized
that the effort to radically reorient the operant paradigms of the field
would be jeopardized unless strict guidelines enforced uniformity.
The ALI transmutation of alimony is emblematic of this twin goal of
enacting substantive law while extracting judicial discretion. The new
alimony regime features two components: (1) a paradigm switch
from spousal need to compensable loss, and (2) an equally pivotal
shift from broad discretion to fixed rules.14 Professor Ellman’s encomium for the ALI alimony provisions is telling: “[W]e end up with a

11. Ira Mark Ellman, Chief Reporter’s Preface to PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. II, Apr. 18,
1998), at xiii [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. II)]. The penchant for fixed
margins has, of course, had its dissenters:
[The] leading virtue [of discretion] is that it gives a judge authority to respond to
the full range of circumstances a case presents and thus to do justice in each individual case . . . . [T]he need for individualized justice in family law is particularly pressing. People organize and conduct their family lives in a burgeoning and bewildering
variety of ways. And a court’s resolution of a family dispute will matter to the parties
more deeply and durably than in perhaps any other kind of civil litigation.
Schneider, supra note 10, at 234–35; see also Seymour v. Seymour, 433 A.2d 1005, 1007
(Conn. 1980) (commending the legislature for “acting wisely in leaving the delicate and difficult process of fact-finding in family matters to flexible, individualized adjudication of the particular facts of each case without the constraint of objective guidelines”).
12. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Reporter’s Memorandum to PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft
No. 3, pt. II), supra note 11, at xxvi–xxvii (discussing the adoption of child support guidelines
and the benefits of formulaic awards); Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Construction of Norms: Social
Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1904 n.7 (2000) (“Beginning in the mid-1980s, a complex network of federal and state legislation has contributed to
more effective child support enforcement.”).
13. Ellman, supra note 10, at 855.
14. See generally PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, ch. 5.
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system quite similar to that used for the child support guidelines.”15
Moreover, the ALI Principles not only seek to change the legal lens
through which we view spousal support and, to a lesser extent, child
support; in both arenas, the Principles also aim generally to increase
the transfer payments, sometimes markedly so.16 In this regard, fixed
rules might be needed in fending off any rearguard action to revert
to the lower standards currently in effect. Uniformity of standards
also facilitates enforcement. The two decades between 1978 and
1998, roughly coinciding with the initial period of support guidelines, witnessed a fourteenfold increase in child support collections.17
In Part II, this article explores the ALI paradigm shift in the legal treatment of parents. America is well into the era of the postnuclear family, fueled by explosions in the number of children raised in
households with a stepparent and in families with a single parent or
with same-sex coparents.18 However, the legal system, which traditionally gave rights only to natural or adoptive parents, has only fitfully adjusted to the protean family. Part II concludes that the ALI
Principles, which give rights to people who could be considered “equitable parents” or “parents by estoppel,” constitute a major—and
largely successful—effort to adapt the law to the emerging social reality of functional families.
Part III considers the ALI resolution of the economic consequences of dissolution. In their most significant departure from extant law, the Principles have reformulated alimony from a focus on
spousal need to one considering the financial losses stemming from
15. Ellman, supra note 10, at 880.
16. See id. at 882 (ALI alimony awards “are more generous than the alimony awards
that many courts would now order”); Ira Mark Ellman, The Maturing Law of Divorce Finances:
Toward Rules and Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 801, 808 (1999) (ALI child support guidelines
are higher than current norms in the “more common case in which the custodial parent has
significantly less income than the noncustodial parent.”).
17. See Marygold S. Melli, Whatever Happened to Divorce?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 637,
640.
18. See, e.g., Frank Furstenberg, Jr., The New Extended Family: The Experience of Parents
and Children after Remarriage, in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING: CURRENT RESEARCH
AND THEORY 42–43 (1987) (documenting the rapid growth of modern stepfamilies); Kim A.
Feigenbaum, The Changing Family Structure: Challenging Stepchildren’s Lack of Inheritance
Rights, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 167, 173 (2000) (noting that more Americans live in stepfamilies
than in traditional families); John Leland, O.K., You’re Gay. So? Where’s My Grandchild?, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at F1 (noting increase in gay parents); Joseph P. Shapiro & Stephen
Gregory, Kids With Gay Parents, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Sept. 16, 1996), available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/16gay.htm (reporting that “many thousands of homosexuals already are living in virtual marriages and parenting children”).
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the divorce. However, changes in the rules for property division suggest that the ALI is tending toward a reinterpretation and integration of the entire financial question, whether deemed “spousal compensation”19 or the “allocation of marital property.”20 Certain
features of the analysis, such as the virtual fungibility of these concepts as articulated in the Principles and the terms provided for recharacterizing separate property as marital, suggest that the ALI has
produced the blueprints for a new order of economic organization
following dissolution. As the text points out, however, these blueprints, while suggestive, fall short of erecting a coherent final structure.
Finally, Part IV asks the question the ALI drafters declined to
address: Should the rules governing legal dissolution aim at reforming no-fault divorce? Reaction against the perceived excesses of the
no-fault revolution has spawned a contemporary “divorce counterrevolution” whose aim is to strengthen marriage by making divorce
more difficult. By contrast, the ALI Principles sustain the irreversibility of no-fault divorce and maintain that marital misconduct should
generally play no role in dissolution proceedings. Moreover, their rejection of the present challenge to the hegemony of no-fault divorce
also furthers the Principles’ overarching goal of theoretical consolidation. By forestalling a comeback for culpability, the ALI succeeds in
eliminating the judicial role in evaluating fault claims, which had traditionally supplied one of the fountains of overflowing discretion in
divorce law. This refusal to reconsider the no-fault debate is thus essential in preserving the conceptual integrity of the ALI Principles.
II. THE FUNCTIONAL PARENT
A. The Traditional View of Child Custody Favoring Natural or
Custodial Parents
Traditionally, an adult could never intervene in a custody dispute
absent a showing that the child’s biological or adoptive parents were
unfit or unavailable.21 The rationale was so clearly understood that it
19. See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 10.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 879 (1984) (“The law recognizes only one set of parents for a child at any one time, and
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often went unstated: only natural birth or an adoption could convert
an adult-child relationship into that of parent and child.22 The parental rights doctrine held that fit biological or adoptive parents have a
right to custody and decisionmaking with regard to their child, even
if the child’s interests would be better served by a third party.23 As is
evident from its formulation, the parental rights doctrine foreclosed
any best-interests-of-the-child analysis.24 Constitutional protections
have buttressed parents’ rights to privacy25 and to raise their children
as they see fit.26 These rights may not be terminated absent the opportunity for a hearing27 and convincing proof of parental unfitness.28 In other words, “those two persons identified as mother and
father should have all the rights and responsibilities of parenthood,
whereas nonparents should have none.”29
these parents are autonomous, possessing comprehensive privileges and duties that they share
with no one else.”); Petersen v. Rogers, 445 S.E.2d 901 (N.C. 1994) (refusing visitation to
the acting adoptive parents of a child where the child was not eligible for adoption because the
biological parents were not deemed unfit and stating the right of the parents to determine with
whom the child associates).
22. See, e.g., In re Custody of Townsend, 427 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (Ill. 1981) (“The
right and correlative responsibility of a parent to care for his or her child is fundamental and as
ancient as mankind.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(G)(2) (West Supp. 1998) (“‘Legal
parent’ means a biological or adoptive parent whose parental rights have not been terminated.”). As recently as 1981, the White House Conference on Families adopted the National
Pro-Family Coalition’s definition of family, limited to “persons who are related by blood, marriage or adoption.” Elizabeth Weiss, Nonparent Visitation Rights v. Family Autonomy: An
Abridgment of Parents’ Constitutional Rights?, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1085, 1090
(2000).
23. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology
as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 363 (1991); see also Elizabeth S. Scott
& Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2406–14 (1995) (summarizing parental rights’ “deep historical roots” as well as the current policy debates).
24. See Hill, supra note 23, at 363. Nor is this doctrinal incompatibility new. See Irma S.
Russell, Within the Best Interests of the Child: The Factor of Parental Status in Custody Disputes
Arising from Surrogacy Contracts, 27 J. FAM. L. 587, 620–27 (1988–89) (discussing tension
between these two doctrines); Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell, Coming of Age: The
Best Interest of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209,
212–14, 230–44 (1978) (reviewing the changing balance between these two doctrines).
25. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977).
26. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”).
27. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 758–68 (1982).
28. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758–68.
29. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J.
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B. The Shift to More Liberal Child Custody Laws
The common law rules treating the biological family as a bastion
have for some years struggled with the contention that the nuclear
family has “failed”30 and that legal rules need to accommodate the
burgeoning segment of nontraditional families.31 Courts are
slowly32—and legislatures more slowly still33—recognizing the pervasiveness of alternative family forms. Commentators have criticized
the parental rights doctrine34 and called for a speedier legal acknowledgment of operational parenthood.35 To date, the success of nontraditional families in seeking legal recognition, both of their formation and of the consequences of their dissolution, has been mixed.36
459, 468 (1990).
30. Bartlett, supra note 21, at 882; see also id. at 880–82.
31. See, e.g., cases cited in PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 2.03,
Reporter’s Notes cmts. b–c, at 228–32.
32. See, e.g., id.
33. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (1999) (detailing the rights of a “person who
establishes emotional ties creating child-parent relationship”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201
(2000) (statute providing same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain the same benefits and
protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples). See generally Greg
Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15 (2000)
(discussing impact of Vermont civil union statute).
34. See, for example, McGough & Shindell, supra note 24, at 244–45 (footnote omitted):
[T]he parental rights doctrine as it exists in the United States . . . often operates to
the detriment of the child and creates confusion in the law by forcing a court to
strain the doctrine in order to achieve the desired result. Moreover, the doctrine is
psychologically unsound and seems to present constitutional difficulty.
35. See Polikoff, supra note 29, at 468–527; Kristine L. Burks, Redefining Parenthood:
Childhood Custody and Visitation when Nontraditional Families Dissolve, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 223, 255–58 (1994). The debate has not, of course, been one-sided. See, e.g., Karen
Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957 (1999);
John DeWitt Gregory, Interdependency Theory: Old Sausage in a New Casing: A Response to
Professor Czapanskiy, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037 (1999); John DeWitt Gregory, Blood
Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351
(1998); see generally Laurence C. Nolan, Legal Strangers and the Duty of Support: Beyond the
Biological Tie—But How Far Beyond the Marital Tie? 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2000); Bartlett, supra note 21, at 882–83. Professor Gregory, a major opponent of this ballooning of the
definition of parenthood, castigates as improper invasions of parental prerogatives the approaches sanctioned by judicial opinions and scholarly commentary that, “perhaps influenced
by the Humpty Dumpty school of linguistics, are replete with references to psychological parents, coparents, functional parents, de facto parents, and parents by estoppel, all of whom may
enjoy judicially bestowed rights that may be equal to or superior to those of a child’s natural
parents.” John DeWitt Gregory, Whose Child Is It, Anyway: The Demise of Family Autonomy
and Parental Authority, 33 FAM. L.Q. 833, 840 (1999) (footnote omitted).
36. See Polikoff, supra note 29, at 468–73; Burks, supra note 35, at 224–25.
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While some courts have adapted equitable remedies to grant nontraditional parents functional equivalence, others have refused to stretch
the statutes to encompass these new family units.37 The problem will
not—and cannot—remain unresolved for very long. Increasing
numbers of nontraditional parents are raising children, and when
those unions dissolve, the law must decide by whom and how those
children will continue to be cared for.
Statutory authority generally does not contemplate “third party”
custody awards absent the unavailability or unfitness of the legal parents. Washington’s statute is typical in this regard:
[A] child custody proceeding is commenced in the superior court
by a person other than a parent, by filing a petition seeking custody
of the child in the county where the child is permanently resident
or where the child is found, but only if the child is not in the physical custody of one of its parents or if the petitioner alleges that neither parent is a suitable custodian.38

Similarly, the linchpin for “nonparent” standing to initiate a custody action under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(“UMDA”) is that the child is not in the physical custody of the parent.39 As between traditional and nontraditional parents, child custody is usually portrayed as unitary and indivisible: if the natural par-

37. See, e.g., cases cited in PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, Reporter’s Notes cmts. b–c, at 228–232.
38. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.030(1) (1997); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041
(West 1994) (providing that a nonparent may be awarded custody upon a finding that “granting custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and that granting custody to the
nonparent is required to serve the best interest of the child”).
39. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 401(d)(2), 9 U.L.A. 263–64 (1998) [hereinafter UMDA] (authorizing a “person other than a parent” to commence a child custody proceeding “only if [the child] is not in the physical custody of one of his parents”). See, e.g.,
Olvera v. Sup. Ct., 815 P.2d 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that a nonparent may bring
custody action only if child’s parent does not have physical custody). The UMDA does not
require that a nonparent show unfitness of the natural parent in order to petition for child custody. UMDA § 401(d)(2), 9A U.L.A. 282. See In re Custody of Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150
(Ill. 1986) (stating that once nonparents show that the child is not in the physical custody of
one of the child’s parents, the custody issue is to be decided under the best interests of the
child standard without the necessity of establishing the unfitness of the natural parents); In re
Custody of C.C.R.S., 872 P.2d 1337 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (same). Once the necessary lack
of physical custody is shown, the court must award custody solely in the best interests of the
child, including a consideration of “the interaction and interrelationship of the child with . . .
any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest.” UMDA § 402(3), 9A
U.L.A. 282.
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ents have it, nonparents may not even ask for it.40 Far greater legislative liberality may be seen in an Oregon statute that dramatically expanded the right of nontraditional parents to petition for child custody.41 It provides that “any person . . . who has established
emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship or an ongoing personal relationship with a child” may petition for custodial rights.42
The statute authorizes a court to determine if “a child-parent relationship exists” and whether awarding custody to the person “in loco
parentis” is in the best interests of the child.43 A child-parent relationship, which must either currently exist or have existed within the
six preceding months prior to the filing of the action, is defined in
both psychological and physical terms:
[A] [c]hild-parent relationship . . . [is one] in which . . . a person
having physical custody of a child or residing in the same household as the child supplied, or otherwise made available to the child,
food, clothing, shelter and incidental necessaries and provided the
child with necessary care, education and discipline, and which relationship continued on a day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay and mutuality, that fulfilled the child’s

40. See, e.g., In re Custody of R.R.K., 859 P.2d 998, 1003 (Mont. 1993) (noting that
proper inquiry is whether the parent actually relinquished custody to a nonparent and how
long parent and child were separated); In re Custody of McCuan, 531 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988) (finding that grandparents lacked standing to seek custody because mother had
not relinquished it). Nor may a traditional parent unilaterally shift legal custody of the child to
a third party. See Naylor v. Kindred, 620 N.E.2d 520, 528 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (noting that
traditional parents possess an equal right to custody but that neither has the right to transfer
custody to a nonparent).
41. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (1999). See In re Marriage of Sleeper, 982 P.2d 1126
(Or. 1999) (if the best interests of the child call for custody to the nonbiological parent, the
court must make such an award, unless to do so would violate some supervening right belonging to the biological parent). Hawaii’s statute also contravenes the parental preference doctrine, providing that “[c]ustody may be awarded to persons other than the father or mother
whenever the award serves the best interest of the child.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(2)
(Supp. 1995). Hawaii even prefers the “person who has had de facto custody of the child in a
stable and wholesome home” over a noncustodial parent. Id.
42. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1).
43. Id. § 109.119(3)(a). The determination of the appropriateness of a custodial grant is
to be made by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The statute does not specify a standard for
the court’s determination that a child-parent relationship exists, although it provides that a
petition may be dismissed for failing to state “a prima facie case of emotional ties creating a
child-parent relationship or . . . facts that the intervention is in the best interests of the child.”
Id. § 109.119(5)(a). The statute provides for the awarding of guardianship and visitation
rights under specified circumstances. Id. § 109.119(3)(a)–(b).
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psychological needs for a parent as well as the child’s physical
needs.44

Significantly, courts have interpreted this statute as sanctioning
the award of custodial rights to “psychological” parents, even when
both traditional parents continue to maintain custody. The “existence of two biological parents who are fit and who successfully share
joint custody” has no bearing on whether another person has established a psychological child-parent relationship between herself and
the child.45
1. “Equitable Parent” doctrine
However, similar statutory authority is rare across the American
legal landscape. In order to accommodate the best interests of the
children of these nontraditional unions, courts have begun recommissioning and adapting doctrines from equity practice in order
to adjust the statutory definition.46 For example, some jurisdictions
recognize as an “equitable parent” someone who, in the role of a
parent, has served as a child’s residential caretaker.47 One early decision announcing the doctrine laid out its scope:

44. Id. § 109.119(6)(a). A relationship between a child and a person who is the nonrelated foster parent of the child is not a child-parent relationship under the statute unless the
relationship continued over a period exceeding eighteen months. Id. Visitation rights for nontraditional parties are conditioned upon proof of an “ongoing personal relationship,” defined
as one “with substantial continuity for at least one year, through interaction, companionship,
interplay and mutuality.” Id. § 109.119(6)(d).
45. In re Marriage of Sorensen, 906 P.2d 838, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). The court
noted that the statute neither stated nor implied that a child’s psychological needs for a parent
“can be met by only two individuals.” Id. Nor need the intervenor seeking custody show that
he or she “‘substituted’ for the biological parent.” Id.
46. Some scholars suggest that, through its parens patriae doctrine, Chancery practice in
England at the time of colonization had already made inroads into the common law parental
rights doctrine by granting equitable relief in a variety of custodial situations. See McGough &
Shindell, supra note 24, at 217–21. Apparently, the exercise of these equitable powers by
American courts has lain dormant until recent times.
47. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1995) (involving a
husband who had developed a parent-child relationship with his wife’s two-year-old child,
whom he had treated as his own, who was deemed an equitable parent for custody purposes at
the time of dissolution of the marriage). A similar concept is expressed by holdings that
nonparents served in loco parentis. See, e.g., Bupp v. Bupp, 718 A.2d 1278 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998) (describing how ex-boyfriend of child’s mother, who lived with both mother and child
and, with the mother’s encouragement, acted as a parent to the child is deemed in loco parentis
for purposes of custody determination). See Polikoff, supra note 29, at 483–86, 502–08
(describing equitable parent and in loco parentis doctrines).
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[W]e adopt the doctrine of “equitable parent” and find that a husband who is not the biological father of a child born or conceived
during the marriage may be considered the natural father of that
child where (1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a
relationship as father and child, or the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of such a relationship over a period of
time prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the husband desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the
husband is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child support.48

Some courts, of course, have refused to tunnel around the statutory scheme, preferring to allow the legislature to solve the inconsistencies of the law’s application to nontraditional families.49 Other
courts have employed the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar a biological or adoptive parent from objecting to the conferral of parental
status upon someone who, with that parent’s inducement or acquiescence, had established a parent-child relationship.50 Equitable estoppel has also been applied in cases in which a parent failed to object in a timely fashion to a nonparent’s standing to petition for
custody. For instance, in In re Marriage of Hodge,51 the court held
that the wife was estopped from denying the husband’s paternity of
their child when she had stated on the child’s birth certificate that
48. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); see also V.C. v.
M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (describing same-sex partner of a biological mother who
had assumed a parental role in helping to raise the biological mother’s child had established a
“psychological parenthood” with respect to the child and thus had a legal right to petition for
custody and visitation).
49. See, for example, Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Mo. 1998), which states:
The problem with a court-fashioned “equitable parent” doctrine is that the court
has to improvise, as it goes along, substantive standards and procedural rules about
when legal custody may be modified, what terms and conditions may be set, and
other matters that already have well-charted passageways under state statutes and related court decisions.
See also E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 898 (Mass. 1999) (Fried, J., dissenting) (“Only
the Legislature is in a position to deal systematically and comprehensively with [the subject of
children raised by same-sex partners]. Our imprecise, indirect, and piecemeal entry into this
field can only cause confusion.”)
50. See, e.g., Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 676 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(finding mother estopped from denying her husband’s right to seek custody when she had
publicly held out her husband as the child’s father, and the husband had accepted this role,
despite the fact that both knew that husband was not the child’s biological father). See also
Polikoff, supra note 29, at 491–503 (analyzing the role of equitable estoppel in child custody
cases).
51. 733 P.2d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).

934

3DIFON.DOC

923]

12/5/01 1:05 AM

Unified Field Theory of the Family

her husband was the father of the child, she had represented him as
the father, and she had not raised the issue of paternity until after he
sought to obtain custody in the dissolution proceeding. “Having allowed husband to establish the emotional ties of a child-parent relationship, wife cannot at this late date deny him and the child the
benefits of the relationship.”52
2. Legal principles applied to stepparents
Stepfamilies constitute another “important emerging family configuration”53 which has been buffeted by the inconsistent application
of equitable principles, such as equitable adoption and in loco parentis.54 The latter doctrine is particularly inapt, as it inaccurately implies that a stepparent necessarily replaces a natural parent.55 Although the legal principles attending the relationships between
stepparents and stepchildren remain unsettled, membership in stepfamilies now outnumbers that in biological families,56 and the cultural norm is shifting to a recognition that “[c]hildren will benefit
from having more responsible adults in their lives rather than
fewer.”57
52. Id. at 459–60; see also In re Marriage of Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028 (Or. Ct. App.
1996), aff’d on other grounds, 982 P.2d 1126 (Or. 1999) (applying equitable estoppel). Courts
have also relied on the related doctrine of waiver to effect the same result as under estoppel
analysis. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sechrest, 560 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
that although nonparents lacked standing to seek custody, mother waived this issue by failing
to raise it, under circumstances in which prejudice would result from removing a young child
from the custodial relationship he had enjoyed with nonparents for three years); In re Custody
of Gonzalez, 561 N.E.2d 1276 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (same rule).
53. Mary Ann Mason & David W. Simon, The Ambiguous Stepparent: Federal Legislation in Search of a Model, 29 FAM. L.Q. 445, 450 (1995); see also David L. Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents, and the Law’s Perceptions of “Family” After Divorce, in DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 102–29 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
54. See MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW 16–27, 60–63 (1994);
Susan M. Silverman, Note, Stepparent Visitation Rights: Toward the Best Interest of the Child,
30 J. FAM. L. 943 (1991–92).
55. See Mason & Simon, supra note 53, at 470 (“The stepparent is not actually standing
in the place of the parent since the divorced noncustodial parent still possesses rights and obligations with respect to the child.”); see also Marcy Goldstein, The Rights and Obligations of
Stepparents Desiring Visitation with Stepchildren: A Proposal for Change, 12 PROB. L.J. 145,
146–47 (1995) (noting the unpredictable results in courts’ application of the in loco parentis to
stepparent cases).
56. See Feigenbaum, supra note 18.
57. Mason & Simon, supra note 53, at 467. See Stepparent Rights, (Feb. 25, 2000),
available at http://stepparenting.about.com/parenting/stepparenting/library/weekly/aa022500a.htm (“[M]any stepparents today are more than just ‘Mommy’s husband’ or ‘Daddy’s
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However sinuous the path of the law, its direction seems relatively clear: we are in a transitional stage along the continuum from
sanctioning only biologically based families to legally recognizing
functional families.58 The passage is by no means smooth or uniform.
Indeed, the legal and cultural fluctuations during this intermediate
stage suggest unresolved ideological clashes. Note, for example, the
ironic twist at the heart of litigation in which biological parents have
sought to terminate the relationship between their child and their
former coparent. In some of the cases involving lesbian coparents,
the biological mother has endeavored to defeat the custodial or visitation claims of her former partner by reverting to parental rights
discourse to exalt the biological link above all others, in contravention of her prior agreements and her behavior in jointly raising the

wife’ . . . they are parents in every way to their stepchildren, yet they are unrecognized by the
courts as family members.”). See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 44–47 (1997) (discussing legal issue in recognizing multiple
parents for a child). Some legal recognition has been afforded to the stepparent-child relationship, often in curious, indirect ways. For example, a Washington family expense statute designed to protect creditors who provide goods and services includes stepchildren among the
designated family members. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (West 1997). A Nebraska
criminal nonsupport law covers stepchildren. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-706 (Supp. 1988). Several
states impose a duty to support stepchildren who are, or are likely to become, recipients of
public assistance. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. § 101 (1992). The New Jersey Supreme Court
estopped a divorcing stepparent from denying a postdivorce obligation to support his stepchildren based upon his pre-divorce rejection of support from the children’s natural father. Miller
v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984).
58. See, e.g., MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS 119–42 (1999) (favoring model
of de facto parenthood); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (same); V.C. v.
M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (same); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419
(Wis. 1995) (same); Polikoff, supra note 29 (same); Bartlett, supra note 21 (same). These
evolving family forms have received a great deal of popular attention. See, e.g., Debra
Rosenberg, Gays: A Place of Their Own, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 15, 2001, available at http://www.
msnbc.com/news/512598.asp#BODY; Jane Gross, A Quiet Town of Potlucks, Church Socials
and Two Dads: Gays Find Warm Welcome in a New Jersey Suburb, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000,
at B8; Leland, supra note 18; Same-Sex Dutch Couples Gain Marriage and Adoption Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/20/world/
20DUTC.html; Herbert A. Glieberman, Should De Facto Parents Have Visitation Rights?,
USLaw.com Library, available at http://www.uslaw.com/library/article/TNPFamilyColl024defacto.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2000); E. J. Graff, Equal Rights: When Heather’s
Mommies Share Custody, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1999, at E1; Jason M. Fields & Charles L.
Clark, Unbinding the Ties: Edit Effects of Marital Status on Same Gender Couples, U.S. Census
Bureau, Population Division Working Paper No. 34 (April 1999), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0034.html (last visited Feb.
6, 2001); Frank Bruni, A Small-But-Growing Sorority is Giving Birth to Children for Gay Men,
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1998, at A12.
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child with a lesbian coparent.59 The legal position taken by the biological parent in a 1995 case decided by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court is illustrative of this rhetorical recrudescence.60 Two women
shared a “close, committed relationship for more than ten years,” a
union solemnized by an exchange of vows and rings.61 They made a
joint decision that one of them would be artificially inseminated, and
both fully participated jointly in all aspects of parenting, from attending the childbirth classes together to giving the child a surname
formed by combining their last names to discharging together the
actual parenting responsibilities. When their domestic union dissolved, the nonbiological parent sought to continue her role in child
rearing. The biological mother’s response did not consist of a claim
that her former coparent was unfit, or that custody or visitation by
her would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. Rather,
the birth mother sought to deny (successfully as to custody and unsuccessfully as to visitation) the other’s standing to petition for any
role in the child’s life. Assertion of the parental rights doctrine under
these circumstances is troubling. It illustrates the legal system’s reluctance to address even the possibility of substantial harm to a child of
a nontraditional union when one of the child’s parents is allowed legally to convert the other into a nonparent and deprive the child of a
nurturing parental influence.62

59. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 58.
60. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
61. Id. at 421.
62. Reactions to a 1999 California appellate case that rebuffed the claims of a nonbiological lesbian coparent suggest the divisiveness of this issue. See Z.C.W. v. K.G.W., 71 Cal.
App. 4th 524 (1999) (declining to grant visitation rights not authorized by statute even
though the nonbiological parent had “exhibited the characteristics of a de facto parent”).
Counsel for the prevailing birth mother in Z.C.W. claimed that the court’s ruling represented
“a victory for parents—and in particular for parents who are lesbians—in renewing the decision
that they are entitled to the same rights as other parents.” Mike McKee, Court Rules in Lesbian
Mother’s Favor, The Recorder/Cal Law, April 20, 1999, at http://www.lawnewsnet.com/
stories/A796-1999Apr19.html (quoting Carol Amyx). Such an assertion employs transparent
rhetorical legerdemain, in declaring that “parents” have won when one parent has utilized a
hiatus in the formal law to deprive her child and her former coparent of an established parentchild relationship. On the other side of the argument, the legal director of the National Center
for Lesbian Rights, who filed an amicus curiae brief in Z.C.W., protested that the court failed
“to recognize the reality of our families and provide our children with the same rights and protections that children of heterosexuals are able to take for granted.” Id. (quoting Kathryn
Kendell).
Some commentators have suggested a different approach to the issues posed by nontraditional families: that the state abandon the business of regulating marriage and focus only on
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C. The ALI Position: Legal Parents, Parents by Estoppel,
and De Facto Parents
Where, on this scale, do the ALI Principles fall? They acknowledge that the law at present reflects a “conflicted stance” on the issue
of redefining parenthood.63 They aim at resolving the tension between society’s allocation of full legal recognition to traditional parents and the dawning reality that disallowing the interests of functional parents “ignores child-parent relationships that may be
fundamental to the child’s sense of security and stability.”64 Accordingly, the Principles suggest a compromise: “What is needed is a rule
that allows continued contacts by de facto parents whose participation in the child’s life is important to the child’s welfare, without unnecessarily intruding on the autonomy of parents that is essential to
the meaningful exercise of their responsibility.”65 In thus suggesting a
relatively fixed rule rather than the equity-based discretion on which
some courts had relied to address the issue of functional parenting,
the Principles here recapitulate in miniature the overall ALI policy of
replacing discretionary justice with bright lines.
The proposed structure consists of a tripartite division of parents
into “legal parents,” “parents by estoppel,” and “de facto parents.”66
Briefly described, a “legal parent” is one already recognized as a par-

ensuring fair treatment of adults and children. See, e.g., Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New
Millennium: Heterosexual, Same-Sex—Or Not At All?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271 (2000) (suggesting
that marriage be delegalized in order to equalize heterosexual and gay/lesbian domestic unions); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228–29 (1995) (same). But see Katharine T. Bartlett, Cracking Foundations as Feminist Method, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 31, 45
(2000) (“Ideally, the state should recognize the benefits of two-parent families to children,
and pursue appropriate measures to support the institution still preferred by many couples,
without undermining the ability of unmarried couples who choose to have families to do so.”).
63. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS, Introduction, at 6 (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I, Mar. 20, 1998) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I)].
64. Id.
65. Id. at 7; see Shapiro, supra note 7, at 774 (stating that in addressing the scope of
parenthood, ALI drafters “have chosen a middle ground that expands the definition of parent
but still employs a sharp limitation”).
66. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, § 2.03. An earlier version of
this section lacked the “de facto parent” category. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt.
I), supra note 63, § 2.03.
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ent by state law.67 A “parent by estoppel” is an adult not currently
identified as a legal parent, but who “has acted as a parent under certain specified circumstances which serve to estop the legal parent
from denying the individual’s status as a parent.”68 Such an individual is “afforded all of the privileges of a legal parent.”69 The parental
triptych is completed by a “de facto” parent, an individual who performed the functions of a child’s primary parent without meeting all
the requirements of a parent by estoppel, and without obtaining the
panoply of parental rights afforded legal parents or parents by estoppel.70 The designation of parent by estoppel constitutes a codification
of the equitable estoppel arguments described above. The Principles
identify the elements of functional parenthood as arising from an equitable defense rather than an affirmative right.71 Section 2.03(1)(b)
attempts to legitimate (or, technically, to preclude objections to legitimize) the parental status of individuals who, for a substantial period of time, lived their lives, relative to their domestic partner and
the child in question, as if they were traditional coparents.72 In their
67. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, § 2.03(1)(a) & cmt. a.
68. Id. at cmt. b. An individual who is liable for child support under chapter 3 of the
Principles is also deemed a parent by estoppel. Id. § 2.03(1)(b)(i). The facts of H.S.H.-K., described above and typical of many coparenting cases, provide a prototype of the equitable estoppel claim which readily translates into the ALI “parent by estoppel.” Under the Principles,
and so long as the court found that recognition as a parent to be in the child’s best interests,
the nonbiological parent would in these circumstances be deemed a “parent by estoppel”: an
individual who “lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full and
permanent responsibilities as a parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the
child’s legal parent . . . to raise a child together each with full parental rights and responsibilities . . . .” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, § 2.03(1)(b)(iii).
69. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, § 2.03(1)(a), at cmt. b.
70. Id. § 2.03(1)(c). A de facto parent is viewed as someone who falls short of the
guidelines of a parent by estoppel:
Occasionally, an individual who is not a legal parent under state law and who does
not have a child-support obligation, did not have the good-faith belief that he was
the child’s parent, . . . did not have an agreement with the legal parent to serve as a
co-parent, or otherwise does not meet the requirements of a parent by estoppel, may
nonetheless have functioned as the child’s primary parent.
Id.
71. Cf. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 968 (R.I. 2000) (stating that “generally
speaking, the estoppel doctrine acts as a legal shield rather than a sword”); Burks, supra note
35, at 256–57 (proposing statutory recognition of “functional parents” and granting them
“the status of legal parents”).
72. A parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a legal parent:
(i) is liable for child support under [the ALI child support guidelines]; or
(ii) lived with the child for at least two years and
(A) over that period had a reasonable good-faith belief that he was the child’s
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legal taxonomy, the Principles thus seek to reinforce the perimeter of
the doctrinal expansion which is already evident in some quarters of
the common law, while also staking out an independent ground for
the concept of functional parenthood.73 On this score, the ALI Principles keep pace with the changing domestic dynamic and attempt to
bridge the “dangerous disconnect”74 between the formal law and the
way people live their lives and construct their families.75
biological father, based on marriage to the mother or on the actions or representations of the mother, and fully accepted parental responsibilities consistent
with that belief, and
(B) thereafter continued to make reasonable, good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities as the child’s father, even if that belief no longer existed; or
(iii) lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full and
permanent responsibilities as a parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with
the child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a
child together each with full parental rights and responsibilities, when the court
finds that recognition as a parent is in the child’s best interests; or
(iv) lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full and
permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with the child’s
parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that
recognition as a parent is in the child’s best interests.
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, § 2.03(1)(b).
73. See Wriggins, supra note 7, at 298 (“‘Familistic’ relationships and relationships of
mutual dependence and support between coupled adults are good for society, as well as the
members of the relationship, and should be recognized and supported by law.”).
74. Id.; see also Alison H. Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of
the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 508, 533 (1998) (arguing that,
although “[f]amilies are working out a multiplicity of relationships and roles for all the parentfigures and extended family members . . . [o]ur legal framework remains detached from reality”) (footnote omitted).
75. See Hill, supra note 23, at 419–20, which states,
[T]he biological conception does not square with a number of other, equally deep,
intuitions. It is not consistent with the modern understanding that parenthood is as
much a social, psychological, and intentional status as it is a biological one . . . .
[M]ost fundamentally, the biological conception of parenthood cannot be reconciled with the belief that other moral considerations sometimes may override claims
predicated upon the biological relationship. In essence, the claims of biology cannot
be deemed to trump invariably the moral claims of those who entertain no biological connection with the child.
Arguments from estoppel principles dovetail with this moral argument, particularly when
a biological parent has cooperated in forming and upholding a child-parent relationship between that parent’s child and that parent’s coparent. See Rubano, 759 A.2d at 976 (“[T]he fact
that [the biological parent] not only gave birth to this child but also nurtured him from infancy does not mean that she can arbitrarily terminate [her coparent’s] de facto parental relationship with the boy, a relationship that [the biological parent] agreed to and fostered for
many years.”). The moral core of this estoppel principle serves to prevent a parent who gives
birth to a child and joins in creating parental rights in a coparent from later denying the existence of the latter when the coparental union has dissolved.
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A recent opinion by the Rhode Island Supreme Court demonstrates both the creative reach of equitable doctrines and statutory
interpretation techniques and the need for adoption of the ALI determinate rule.76 In the course of its divided opinion, the court explored most of the issues at play in the question of deciding the parental status of nontraditional parents.77 An extended look at this
case illustrates the successes—and limitations—of this approach.
Maureen Rubano and Concetta DiCenzo are two women who
“agreed to become the parents of a child.”78 They planned for
DiCenzo to be artificially inseminated, and after the child’s birth,
they jointly raised him “for four years while living together as
domestic partners in the same household.”79 After their “committed
relationship” dissolved, their dispute about child custody and
visitation reached the courts. Upon certification from the family
court, the supreme court declared that the statute conferring
jurisdiction upon the family court over “equitable matters arising out
of the family relationship” required a necessary trigger of a petition
for divorce, bed and board, or separate maintenance, a prerequisite
absent in this case.80 However, the court found that a different
statute entitled Rubano to bring an action to have the family court
Of course, equity was born of a tension between statutory limits and the courts’ obligation to provide justice to the parties. In Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991),
the New York Court of Appeals refused to interpret the statutory term “parent” to include a
functional parent who had established her child-parent relationship in the context of a lesbian
coparenting agreement. Id. at 30. Recently, a family court in New York relied on equitable
estoppel to outflank the Alison D. precedent. See J.C. v. C.T., 711 N.Y.S.2d 295 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 2000) (allowing the former same-sex partner of the children’s biological mother to petition
for visitation under equitable estoppel principles). One commentator opined that such equitable estoppel cases in New York are “well-intentioned, but intentionally badly reasoned,” a
problem that he attributed to the need to circumvent the restrictive Alison D. holding. Robert
Z. Dobrish, No Final Word on ‘Alison D.’, N.Y. L.J. Jan. 9, 2001, at Letters to the Editor.
“Thank goodness for the concept of equitable estoppel. It is being used to achieve equity in
the face of outdated legal precedents that otherwise would stand in the way of doing the right
thing.” Id.
Whether society’s acceptance of homosexual parents is the “right thing” is the subject of
another intense debate. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833; Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with
Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253;
Lynn D. Wardle, Fighting with Phantoms: A Reply to Warring with Wardle, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 629.
76. Rubano, 759 A.2d at 968–70.
77. The Rubano court divided 3-2 on the central issues of the case. See id.
78. Id. at 961.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 963–65 (interpreting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3(a) (1956)).
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Rubano to bring an action to have the family court determine “the
existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship” between herself and the child, because her visitation agreement with
DiCenzo and her alleged de facto parental relationship with the child
rendered her an “interested party” within the meaning of that statute.81 Additionally, the court determined that Rubano had available a
remedy to seek enforcement of the parties’ visitation agreement,
which had been entered as a consent order, pursuant to a statutory
grant of jurisdiction to the family court to hear matters relating to
adults “who shall be involved with paternity of children born out of
wedlock.”82 The court’s rationale for linking Rubano to the child’s
“paternity” was twofold. Initially, the court took heed of the state
legislature’s guide to statutory construction, which declared that
“[e]very word importing the masculine gender only, may be construed to extend to and to include females as well as males.”83 The
court held that Rubano was “‘involved with [the child’s] paternity’”
in that DiCenzo’s alternative insemination occurred only pursuant to
the parties’ joint decision to bear and raise a child together.84 Secondly, the court relied upon facts asserted by Rubano in her petition
to bolster its conclusion that she was an interested party in the
child’s paternity: Rubano not only helped to plan and arrange the
child’s conception, but was primarily responsible for the financial
costs of the procedure; her name appeared on the child’s birth certificate, which listed his surname as “Rubano-DiCenzo”; she and
DiCenzo sent out birth announcements identifying themselves as the
child’s parents; and she coparented the child for four years, thereby
becoming his de facto parent.85 Next, the court addressed federal
constitutional considerations, acknowledging the fundamental right
of parents to make “‘decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of [their] children.’”86 However, the court also recognized
that “‘persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with in-

81. See id. at 965–66 (interpreting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-26). The court indicated
that the statute did not require that the “interested party” allege that she was the biological
parent of the child. Id.
82. Id. at 970 (interpreting R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-10-3(a)).
83. Id. (interpreting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3(a)).
84. Id. at 971 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3(a)).
85. See id.
86. Id. at 976 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)).
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creasing frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing,’”87
and that “‘the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association.’”88 Under certain circumstances, even the existence of a developed
relationship between the biological parent and the child will not prevent others from acquiring parental rights as a result of establishing
de facto child-parent relationships.89 Finally, the court noted the harmonic convergence of its ruling with the recently adopted ALI Principles.90 Accordingly, the court avowed that “‘children have a strong
interest in maintaining ties that connect them to adults who love and
provide for them,’ an interest that ‘lies in the emotional bonds that
develop between family members as a result of shared daily life.’”91
The court affirmed the emerging legal rule, consistent with the ALI
position, that “a person who has no biological connection to a child
but who has served as a psychological or de facto parent to that child
may, under [certain specified] limited circumstances . . . establish his
or her entitlement to parental rights vis-a-vis the child.”92

87. Id. at 973 (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64).
88. Id. at 973 (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)).
89. See id. at 974. In this regard, the court favorably cited V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539
(N.J. 2000) (involving same-sex partner of a biological mother who had assumed a parental
role in helping to raise the biological mother’s child had demonstrated “psychological parenthood” and thus a right to petition for custody and visitation). In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied a four-part test to ascertain the existence of a “psychological parenthood”:
[T]he legal parent must consent to and foster the relationship between the third
party and the child; the third party must have lived with the child; the third party
must perform parental functions for the child to a significant degree; and most important, a parent-child bond must be forged.
V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d at 551.
90. See Rubano, 759 A.2d at 974–75 (referring to Sections 2.03–2.21 of the Principles,
dealing with the allocation of custodial and decisionmaking responsibility for children).
91. Id. at 975 (quoting V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d at 550).
92. Id. Two justices strongly disagreed with most of the majority’s statutory interpretations and application of equitable doctrines. See id. at 977 (Bourcier, J., concurring and dissenting). At virtually every turn, the concurring and dissenting justices indicated their preference for a narrower interpretation of both the statutes and equitable principles in order to
retain the primacy of biological parenthood. More fundamentally, however, these justices
could not conceal their aversion at the protean nature of the modern family. A rhetorical parade of horribles was displayed, including the reductio ad absurdum that the majority’s ruling
would result in legal recognition “that a man can become pregnant after intercourse with a
woman and then require the woman to pay for his hospital and delivery expenses.” Id. at 978.
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The three-to-two division in the Rhode Island Supreme Court
bespeaks the contemporary predicament of functional parenthood.
Dependence on the willingness of courts to adapt equitable principles, often in the face of statutes that never anticipated the present
shape of family evolution, may have been a necessary prelude to
codification of a new legal standard. However, the ALI Principles
represent a declaration that experimentation should now yield to
consolidation. In the contested terrain of modern parenthood, the
ALI has shaped a clear and functional path.93
III. UNIFYING THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISSOLUTION
The ALI Principles consider the interspousal financial aftermath
of dissolution in two separate chapters, but the thrust of the ALI
treatment virtually merges these financial consequences. Chapter 4
allocates spousal property at dissolution, while chapter 5 recasts the
rules for what was traditionally termed “alimony.” In general, the
ALI preserves the distinction between marital and separate property,
with a presumption that marital property would be divided equally
between the spouses.94 The ALI treatment of alimony, on the other
The concurring and dissenting opinion ended with a stunning mischaracterization of the issue
presented in the case, describing it as “a petition for visitation by a person who neither has an
adoptive nor blood relationship to the child . . . based solely upon a prior homosexual relationship with the biological mother.” Id. at 990.
93. See John C. Sheldon, Anticipating the American Law Institute’s Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution, 14 ME. B. J. 18, 28 (1999) (expressing a trial judge’s view that
“[t]he number of cases in which a judge wants—and, frankly, ought—to award more than the
right of contact to a de facto parent is increasing daily”). Nor is this insight new. See, e.g.,
Looper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487, 488–89 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978) (“Those involved with
domestic relations problems frequently see situations where one who is not a natural parent is
thrust into a parent-figure role, and through superior and faithful performance produces a
warm and deeply emotional attachment.”). Evidence from the social sciences suggests that
“forms of nonmarital living arrangements may replace marriage in the future.” Dennis K.
Orthner, The Family Is in Transition, in THE FAMILY IN AMERICA 25, 27 (David L. Bender &
Bruno Leone eds., 1992); see also STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC
REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE xiii–xiv (1988) (“Today the
term ‘family’ is no longer attached exclusively to conjugal or nuclear families comprising a husband, wife, and their dependent children. It is applied to almost any grouping of two or more
people domiciled together.”); John Bradshaw, Family, in IMAGINE: WHAT AMERICA COULD
BE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 213 (Marianne Williamson ed., 2000) (anticipating new family configurations, including communal marriages, gay and lesbian marriages, “family cooperatives,”
and “legally sanctioned childless or open marriages where people agree to their own kinds of
sexual contracts”).
94. See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, §§ 4.03–4.08; Herma
Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family
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hand, constitutes a thorough revision of the legal principles mandating the continuation of financial exchanges between ex-spouses, with
the objective of “compensation for losses rather than meeting
needs.”95 The treatment of both sets of financial consequences is interwoven to such an extent that it seems fair to ask if the ALI has virtually merged them into one category, and what might be the consequences of such a unified approach.
A. Traditional View: Property Division and Alimony
Considered Separately
That property division and spousal compensation are considered
separately is a historical fortuity, due to their emergence during different historical epochs.96 At common law, wives surrendered their
property rights at the altar in exchange for their husbands’ commitment to support them during the marriage, which was supposed to
last until death.97 Alimony arose as a way for the law to enforce the

Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017, 2070 (2000)
(“The [ALI] property division sections offer a redefinition of ‘marital’ and ‘separate’ property
for use at dissolution that generally follows community property concepts.”). One significant—
if not startling—innovation results in a gradual transmutation of separate property into marital
property over the course of a relatively lengthy marriage. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4),
supra note 31, § 4.18. (“Recharacterization of Separate Property as Marital Property at the
Dissolution of Long-Term Marriages”); see infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text (analyzing this provision).
95. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, § 5.02 cmt. a (emphasis
omitted). The ALI reconceptualization of alimony tracks the outlines laid out in Ira Mark
Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); see, e.g., id. at 12 [hereinafter Ellman, Theory of Alimony] (proposing “an alternative theory of alimony designed to encourage
socially beneficial sharing behavior in marriage by requiring compensation for lost earning capacity arising from that behavior”). Ellman’s reformulation of alimony has spawned an outpouring of commentary, some of it quite critical of his underlying theory. See, e.g., June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND.
L. REV. 1463 (1990); John C. Sheldon & Nancy Diesel Mills, In Search of a Theory of Alimony, 45 ME. L. REV. 283 (1993); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of
Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227 (1994); Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the
Marriage Contract, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 91 (1993); Cynthia Starnes, Applications of a Contemporary Partnership Model for Divorce, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 107 (1993).
96. See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 10. For
an account of the origins of equitable distribution, see BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 2–18 (2d ed. 1994). An account of alimony’s beginnings may be
found in Chester G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law
and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1939).
97. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 7
(2000); Murphy, supra note 7, at 1145–46.
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husband’s support obligation after a divorce a mensa et thoro, which
today we would call a legal separation, since the spouses were still
considered married although separately domiciled.98 In modern
times, the issue of postmarital property in the United States divided
in two, with community property principles in several jurisdictions,
while the great majority evolved from a title scheme to one of equitable distribution.99 Alimony, on the other hand, became a fluid doctrine whose consistency conformed to the shape of the rationale into
which it was poured: spousal need, maintenance of marital living
standards, support at subsistence level, punishment for sexual transgression, reward for fidelity, contractual right, and partnership
duty.100
The conceptual domains of property division and alimony are
each now severely contested.101 In search of a justifiable rationale for
both, the ALI Principles have practically fused them. Domestic relations practice has long considered both aspects as fungible in seeking
a resolution of a dissolution case.102 Particularly with its reformulation of the rationale for alimony, the ALI Principles have now limned
a theoretical basis for considering property division and alimony as
subsets of a unitary decision.
B. The ALI View: Property Division and Alimony Practically Fused
The Principles state that the rules for property division are intended to “respect both spousal ownership rights in their property
and the equitable claims that each spouse has on the property in consequence of their marital relationship.”103 While this formulation
mirrors prevailing law, the concept of equitable claims stemming
from the marital relationship also constitutes one pillar of the revamped alimony structure, as may be seen from the treatment of
spousal earning capacity. Gains during the marriage in spousal earning capacity and skills are deemed “not property divisible on divorce.”104 Yet relative earning capacity can generate a claim for

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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See Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 96, at 198.
See TURNER, supra note 96, at 2–18.
See Ellman, Theory of Alimony, supra note 95, at 3–7.
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See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 10.
Id. § 4.02(1).
See id. § 4.07 cmt. a, at 146–47.
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spousal compensatory payments.105 Section 5.05(1) explains the rationale:
A person married to someone of significantly greater wealth or
earning capacity is entitled at dissolution to compensation for the
reduced standard of living he or she would otherwise experience, if
the marriage was of sufficient duration that equity requires the loss,
or some portion of it, be treated as the spouses’ joint responsibility.106

The interplay of these sections demonstrates the interlocking nature of the ALI Principles, particularly with regard to the financial
consequences of dissolution.107 The Principles make transparent both
the interdependence of these provisions and their fundamental interchangeability.108 Although the commentary averts to the “different
procedural and substantive traditions” of alimony and property
claims, it admits that the two are “financially fungible.”109 The comments also suggest that the “historical unreliability” of alimony led
to the pitching of earning capacity claims as matters for property division.110 With the greater consistency and predictability of ALI-style
compensatory payments, presumably these claims will revert to the

105. See id. § 5.05(1)
106. See id. § 5.03 (detailing which earning capacity losses are recognized under sections
5.05–5.12). Reimbursable earning capacity losses are further delineated in section 5.06,
“Compensation for Primary Caretaker’s Residual Loss in Earning Capacity,” and section 5.12,
“Compensation for the Residual Loss of Earning Capacity Arising from the Care of Third Parties.”
107. The official commentary makes this linkage explicit:
Chapters 4 and 5 reflect a common policy of recognizing the validity of spousal
claims on one another’s earning capacity by compensatory payments rather than by
characterizing that earning capacity as marital property. The two Chapters are thus
interdependent. The rationale for each depends in part on the other’s resolution of
this common policy question.
Id. § 4.07 cmt. a, at 147.
108. Id.; see also Ellman, Theory of Alimony, supra note 95, at 12 (“There is a link between spousal claims for alimony and those for a share in the property accumulated during the
marriage: both are financial claims against one’s former spouse based on the spousal relationship, and are in that sense fungible.”).
109. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, § 4.07, cmt. a, at 147. As
the commentary notes, some recent court decisions treat earning capacity as property rather
than alimony, and the decision on where to locate this component of dissolution finances
within the larger scheme depended primarily on a balance of complexity and conceptual clarity,
which the ALI reformers believed tilted toward compensatory payments rather than toward
property division. Id. at 147–51.
110. Id. at 147.
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alimony side of the ledger.111 Whatever merit this reasoning derives
from an accurate reading of history,112 it serves to emphasize the
contingency of categorization in all financial reallocations between
ex-spouses.113 The Principles nearly extinguish the boundary separating these two remedies by authorizing the trial court to make an
award of compensatory payments by “an enhancement of the obligee’s share of the marital property.”114
In dimming any bright line demarcating property rights from
alimony concerns, the ALI is expounding on a theme found in many
contemporary judicial decisions. Most cases involving the “diploma
dilemma,”115 for example, have struggled with a problem that cuts
across the traditional borders between the two remedies. The issue
presented when a newly minted doctor or lawyer divorces the spouse
whose labor paid for the professional education is nearly insoluble
under traditional legal analysis. But courts have ingeniously manufactured remedies that transcend the doctrinal barriers. The New York
Court of Appeals found a professional license to be divisible property, despite its lack of the ordinary attributes of property, and ordered “an award in lieu of its actual distribution.”116 Most courts
have rejected so plastic a property definition, and some have resolved
the dilemma by discovering an extraordinary suppleness to alimony
law, even when statutory spousal support criteria were ostensibly limited to need and employability.117 Some courts crafted “reimburse111. Id.
112. On the historical friability of alimony rights, as well as the meager sums traditionally
awarded, see J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL
CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 62–64, 107–11 (1997) (describing “[t]he most striking aspect of alimony [as] its scarcity”); Murphy, supra note 7, at 1148–
49 (same).
113. As Professor Melli has pointed out, except for community property states, until the
equitable distribution revolution property division also provided relatively little post-marital
financial shifting for most couples. Melli, supra note 17, at 640; see also Marsha Garrison, Good
Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOKLYN L. REV. 621, 739 (1991) (empirical study detailing the “confused, inconsistent, and unexpected results” of New York’s equitable distribution law).
114. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, § 5.11(2)(b) (emphasis
omitted).
115. Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d 131, 132 (Ohio 1986).
116. O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 717 (N.Y. 1985).
117. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1987) (expanding the definition of the support level required for alimony from subsistence to reasonable in light of the
expectations generated by the professional degree). For other rationales enlarging alimony provisions in these circumstances, see cases cited in TURNER, supra note 96, at 407 n.501.
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ment alimony” to suit the task at hand.118 Reimbursement alimony
often does not terminate on remarriage, may not be modifiable for
changed circumstances, and may be ordered as a lump sum payable
in installments.119 Thus reconstituted, alimony bears a strong resemblance to an award of property. The ALI follows suit, resolving the
diploma dilemma by declaring that such licenses are not divisible
property, but instead relevant to a claim on spousal earning capacity,
to be treated under the rubric of compensable losses.120
Once alimony lost its medieval connection to the husband’s continuing obligation to support his wife during a legal separation, it
floated from one conceptual mooring to another, as evidenced by
the modulations from alimony to spousal support to maintenance to
the ALI version, compensatory payments.121 The awkwardness of
any of the legal constructs, even the ALI’s, suggests a fundamental
disorientation which may not be adequately redirected by yet one
more turn. Some commentators have called for alimony and all its
synonyms to be “abolished from the lexicon,” since financial payments to spouses after dissolution are better approached as a subset
of the overall property issue.122 Professor June Carbone, whose formulation differs from that of the ALI and its Chief Reporter, has argued that “[u]nder a true restitution system,” alimony would be replaced by a “reaffirmation of both spouses’ obligations to contribute
to the benefits that the marriage made possible.”123
The need to make alimony awards modifiable presents the principal hurdle to a full merger of alimony and property division. Traditionally, property awards were viewed as permanent, while periodic
interspousal payments could be altered or ended as material circumstances changed.124 However, as we have seen,125 the walls between

118. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa 1989); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1988). But see
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991) (refusing to apply the concept of “equitable
restitution,” a concept similar to “reimbursement alimony”).
119. See TURNER, supra note 96, at 407–08.
120. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, § 4.07.
121. See Mary E. O’Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory,
23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 456 (1988) (suggesting that alimony in a sense became obsolete
after divorces a vinculo widely replaced those a mensa et thoro).
122. Carbone, supra note 95, at 1464 n.4.
123. Id. at 1500–01.
124. See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 7–8.
125. See supra notes 94–109 and accompanying text.
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these distinctions have for some time been crumbling. The ALI
Principles themselves provide the basis for a solution to this dilemma.
When alimony was enforced as a private welfare measure, obliging a
husband to continue to care for a wife in need, the necessity for
monitoring an award was based on the wife’s capacity to transfer the
burden of support from her first husband to her second. Moreover,
need-centered spousal payments, for historical reasons, are incapable
of consistent measure. If the rationale becomes a compensation for
loss, however, we may more feasibly discuss at least the possibility of
a more accurate, fixed assessment, payable in a lump sum, periodically, or a combination of both.126 Conversely, if the need for modifiability remains significant for policy reasons, we may question the
wisdom of a once-for-all-time property division. Particularly if the
theoretical principles underlying post-dissolution finances will now
be closing ranks behind lawyers’ almost invariable practice of negotiating the two basic remedies in tandem, we may at least challenge
the rationale for nonmodifiability of property judgments.127 Whether
or not the ultimate policy decision leaves all financial questions subject to reopening, the present system allowing only one of the two
components of the pecuniary judgment to be modifiable has lost
whatever historical validity it might once have had.
The ALI drive to consolidate and willingness to transcend traditional financial categorization is otherwise amply demonstrated in
the highly controversial proposal contained in section 4.18, “Recharacterization of Separate Property as Marital Property at the Dissolution of Long-Term Marriages.” As the caption denotes, this section

126. See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, § 5.11. Note, however,
that the ALI provides for termination of compensatory payments upon the remarriage or cohabitation of the payee spouse. Id. §§ 5.08, 5.10. Since the traditional—and now invalidated—
rationale for ending alimony upon remarriage was the transfer of a woman’s dependence from
one husband to another, it is disconcerting that the ALI revives this notion, so inconsistent
with its fundamental rationale that alimony should only represent compensation for financial
losses. The official commentary’s explanation that remarriage or cohabitation should operate to
terminate alimony because of the importance of dissolution’s nonfinancial losses is thus unconvincing, as is the unsupported claim that continued support by the first spouse “would cast
doubt on the second marriage’s authenticity.” Id. § 5.08 cmt. a, at 351(remarriage);
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, § 5.10 cmt. a, at 63 (cohabitation). Both
these arguments are redolent of alimony’s discredited dependence rationale that the ALI purportedly condemns.
127. See generally Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony:
The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827 (1988) (discussing blurring of the line between alimony and property division in order to remedy spousal need).

950

3DIFON.DOC

923]

12/5/01 1:05 AM

Unified Field Theory of the Family

calls for a fundamental alteration of the legal character of property
individually held by the spouses. The percentage of separate property
so recharacterized is to be determined by a formula of statewide application, as is the duration of marriage that will justify the metamorphosis of all spousal assets into marital property.128 This proposal
is linked to chapter 5’s determination of a long-term spouse’s presumptive right to the other spouse’s greater post-dissolution earnings.129 The rationale for such a basic recharacterization is an assumption about spousal expectations. Particularly in a longer marriage,
“spouses typically do not think of their separate-property assets as
separate, even if they would be so classified under the technical
property rules.”130 No empirical support is supplied for this proposition.131 Whatever the wisdom of this transmutation provision, it
clearly furthers the ALI consolidation agenda by facilitating the
creation of a joint marital pot whose contents will be divided at dissolution according to the relatively fixed rules of chapter 4.
The metamorphosis of alimony from loss to need is similarly intended to push the law in the direction of unifying this complex area.
“[T]he shift to loss as the primary explanatory concept allows development of rules of adjudication that are more predictable in application than are rules grounded upon a single but ill-defined goal of relieving need.”132 The turn from discretion to rules is thus as
prominent a shift as the underlying reconfiguration of the financial
category.133 Still, for a revision of legal principles so oriented to the
clearing out of a conceptual labyrinth and the purging of historical
detritus, it seems curious that the ALI Principles provide all the
groundwork for the fusion of the financial decisions in the wake of
dissolution, but then fail to propose their actual unification, particularly when a restitution-centered analysis lends itself so well to a
more precise calculus. Nevertheless, on balance, the Principles pro128. See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, § 4.18(1).
129. See id. § 4.18 cmt. a, at 241.
130. Id. at 240.
131. Cf. Oldham, supra note 3, at 810–12 (criticizing this ALI provision and observing
that spouses “frequently have emotional attachments to valuable property given or devised by
family members and would be quite upset . . . if a divorce court would divide it or order a
sale”). Id. at 811.
132. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 9.
133. See Penelope E. Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question at Divorce, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 713, 718 n.24 (2000) (noting that the ALI Principles encapsulate “more determinate”
property division and spousal maintenance provisions).
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vide a major step forward in the consolidation and resolution of the
economic consequences of dissolution.
IV. THE SECOND DEATH OF MARITAL FAULT
A. Overview of the ALI View of Marital Fault:
The Acceptance of No-Fault Divorce
The ALI Principles accept the no-fault divorce revolution as final
and irreversible.134 Consequently, they deny a role for fault as an
“agent of morality,” and find culpability irrelevant to family dissolution proceedings, either in assessing responsibility for the dissolution
itself or in awarding punitive damages.135 Legal claims stemming
from marital misconduct are, in this view, not the proper focus of
family dissolution. Such proceedings should only allocate financial
losses, while “punishment of bad conduct . . . is better left to the
criminal law, . . . [and] compensation for the nonfinancial losses imposed by the other spouse’s battery or emotional abuse[] is better
left to tort law.”136 The focus of the ALI discussion of marital fault is
to negate the potential impact of such misconduct on the economics
of dissolution: “[E]ntitlements to postdivorce financial remedies
[that] arise without regard to the spouse’s relative marital fault.”137
The ALI Principles entirely omit discussion of the role of fault in the

134. See Kay, supra note 94, at 2069 (“The ALI did not plan to revisit the grounds for
divorce. Instead, it accepted the nationwide adoption of no-fault divorce, and undertook to
complete that reform by drafting provisions dealing with the process of dissolution and the
substantive standards relevant to child support, spousal support, property division, and custody
of children.”).
135. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, ch. 1, at 23–26.
136. Id. at 49.
137. Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
773, 785 (1996) [hereinafter Ellman, Place of Fault]. One sense in which the ALI Principles
allow fault to affect the result is the universally recognized rule accounting for the extent to
which marital misconduct has resulted in a diminishment of the marital estate. Id. at 776–77
(observing that “all states recognize the power of dissolution courts to consider, in allocating
marital property, misconduct that has affected directly the amount of property available for
allocation”). This financial cost exception to the no-fault Principles is set forth in section 4.16,
“Financial Misconduct as Grounds of Unequal Division of Marital Property.” Professor
Woodhouse has criticized the concern with marital fault only in terms of its adverse economic
impact as reflecting “a certain reductionist materialism” that ignores “value judgments about
the misuse of power within marriage.” Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation:
The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2529 (1994).
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larger context of the “divorce counterrevolution.”138 This movement
to reverse the perceived evils of unilateral no-fault divorce has garnered wide popular and scholarly attention and generated numerous
proposals to reinforce marital commitment and make divorce more
difficult.139 These legal experiments reflect the larger cultural shift
away from irresponsible marital behavior, particularly in families with
children.140 No-fault divorce has been criticized for eroding “the idea
of marriage as a presumptively permanent relationship—as a structure of incentives for individuals to contribute to the well-being of
the family, and a framework of reasonable expectations of reciprocal
benefits over the lifetime of the partnership.”141 Both law and popular culture are, from this perspective, engaged in refocusing the issue
of family dissolution from one of achieving an easy divorce to one of
maintaining a good marriage.142
138. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 905–34
(2000) (analyzing the “divorce counterrevolution”); Oldham, supra note 3, at 818–20 (reviewing proposals to limit unilateral divorce omitted from the ALI Principles); Wardle, supra
note 7, at 783 n.2 & 784 (criticizing the Principles for ignoring the “significant, widespread,
and growing social movement to reform unilateral no-fault divorce laws”).
139. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Beyond Baehr: Strengthening the Definition of Marriage,
12 BYU J. PUB. L. 277, 279 (1998) (“To strengthen the definition of marriage it is essential
that we ‘The People’ enact laws that make divorce more difficult.”). A sampling of the voluminous popular and legal literature on the divorce counterrevolution includes the following:
BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1997); MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE
ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: HOW WE DESTROY LASTING LOVE (1996); Laura Bradford, The
Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 607 (1997); Laura Gatland, Putting the Blame on No-Fault, 83 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997,
at 50; Robert M. Gordon, The Limit of Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE L.J. 1435 (1998); Pia
Nordlinger, The Anti-Divorce Revolution, WKLY. STANDARD, Mar. 2, 1998, at 25; Wardle,
supra note 7.
140. See Gordon, supra note 139, at 1438 (describing the “Child-Centered Case Against
No-Fault Divorce”).
141. William A. Galston, Divorce American Style, PUB. INT. L. REV., Summer 1996, at
12–13; see also Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855, 883 (1988) (stating that no-fault represents “rebellion against the
propriety of specific performance of marital obligations”).
142. See generally LINDA WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE:
WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000).
The Council on Families in America emphasized this counterrevolutionary aspiration to move
the debate from contemplating the end of marriage to generating its revival:
The divorce revolution—the steady displacement of a marriage culture by a culture
of divorce and unwed parenthood—has failed. It has created terrible hardships for
children, incurred unsupportable social costs, and failed to deliver on its promise of
greater adult happiness. The time has come to shift the focus of national attention
from divorce to marriage and to rebuild a family culture based on enduring marital
relationships.
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B. Movements Against No-Fault Divorce
The measures proposed to reform no-fault divorce have included
the introduction of myriad legislative bills designed to resurrect marital fault as the heart of divorce litigation.143 Another cluster of recommendations counsels couples to engage in pre-commitment bargaining designed to allow them to contractually bind themselves to
each other more tightly than the law currently allows.144 Covenant
marriage laws, according couples the right to renounce recourse to
the state’s no-fault divorce law, enshrine one pre-commitment option.145 These statutes not only define covenant marriage as a “life-

COUNCIL ON FAMILIES IN AMERICA, MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION
293 (David Popenoe et al. eds., 1995). This transformation of the focus of the “counterrevolution” is nicely evidenced in the titles of noted social researcher Judith Wallerstein’s three volumes reporting her study of the impact of divorce on children: from JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN
& JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE
WITH DIVORCE (1980) to JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND
CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989) to JUDITH S.
WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE GOOD MARRIAGE: HOW AND WHY LOVE LASTS
(1995).
143. See DiFonzo, supra note 138, at 916–17, 927–28, 949–54 (analyzing proposals reintroducing fault divorce).
144. See Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing
the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 464–65 (1998) (calling for the enforcement of a
wide range of private agreements regarding divorce grounds and the terms of an ongoing marriage); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L.
REV. 9, 38 (1990) (outlining a “framework for legal transformation of the conception of marriage from a ‘nonbinding’ and transitory bond to a more enduring relationship”). But see Brian
Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We
Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 197 (1998) (“At a minimum, society
should be skeptical about the ability of the earlier self to judge the interests and preferences of
the later self.”).
145. Covenant marriage has developed into a commodious cottage industry among academics. See, e.g., Allen M. Parkman, Reforming Divorce Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 379
(2000); Margaret F. Brinig, Economics, Law, and Covenant Marriage, GENDER ISSUES, Winter/Spring 1998; Jeanne Louise Carriere, “It’s Déjá Vu All Over Again”: The Covenant Marriage Act in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701 (1998);
DiFonzo, supra note 138, at 949–56; Lynne Marie Kohm, A Comparative Survey of Covenant
Marriage Proposals in the United States, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 31, 41–51 (1999–2000);
Melissa Lawton, The Constitutionality of Covenant Marriage Laws, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471
(1998); Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The “Sealed Knot”: A Preliminary Bibliography of “Covenant
Marriage,” 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 145 (1999–2000); Gary H. Nichols, Covenant Marriage:
Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 397 (1999); Scott, supra
note 12, at 1958–68; Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis
and Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 64 (1998) [hereinafter Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant
Marriage]; Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the Meaning of
Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1565–78 (1998); Amy L. Stewart, Covenant Mar-
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long relationship”;146 they explicitly require the spouses making such
a commitment to “solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman who agree to live together as husband
and wife for so long as they both may live.”147 To date, only Louisiana and Arizona have enacted covenant marriage laws,148 but similar
legislation has been introduced in many states, and one prominent
sociologist has opined that “we are on the front end of a covenant
marriage boom that could sweep across the nation.”149 Other proposals counsel mandatory waiting periods before divorce actions may
be filed; delays ranging from two to five years have been specified.150
Requiring mutual consent of the parties has also been advocated as a
brake on unilateral divorce.151 Schedules of obligatory pre-divorce
counseling sessions have been proposed.152 Finally, legislators and
commentators have urged making divorce more difficult or even unavailable to couples with minor children.153
riage: Legislating Family Values, 32 IND. L. REV. 509 (1999).
146. See LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
147. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1).
148. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272–275.1; ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-901 to 25-906
(Supp. 1998).
149. H. J. Cummins, Covenant Vows Would Make Parting Harder, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRIB., June 5, 2000, at 1A (quoting Steven Nock).
150. See Galston, supra note 141, at 22 (proposing a five-year delay); Scott, supra note
144, at 44 (positing that “a two- or three-year waiting period [before dissolution] . . . would
discourage impulsive divorce and provide sufficient opportunity for reconciliation”). Professor
Scott has more recently proposed a minimum “multi-year” commitment period for marriages,
combined with a “notification requirement—such as a two year waiting period from the time
of notification before divorce.” Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational
Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1263 n.91 & 1282 (1998). But see DiFonzo, supra note 138,
at 945–49 (arguing that extended waiting periods have historically failed to deter divorce).
151. See generally Parkman, supra note 95. Note that the Arizona covenant marriage law
(but not its Louisiana counterpart) contains a mutual consent divorce ground. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 25-903(8) (“The husband and wife both agree to a dissolution of marriage.”).
152. See DiFonzo, supra note 138, at 927–28, 950–53 (providing examples).
153. See id. at 927–30 (detailing proposed legislation prohibiting or severely limiting the
dissolution of marriages with minor children); WHITEHEAD, supra note 139, at 188 (calling
for a “change [in] the way we think about the meaning and purpose of divorce, especially divorces involving children”); William A. Galston, Braking Divorce for the Sake of Children, AM.
ENTERPRISE, May–June 1996, at 36 (calling for the elimination of unilateral no-fault divorce
in families with minor children); Symposium, Who Owes What to Whom? Drafting a Constitutional Bill of Duties, HARPER’S, Feb. 1991, at 48 (detailing Christopher Lasch’s call for a constitutional amendment forbidding divorce for “couples with children under the age of twentyone”); Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 90 (1981) (proposing a marital scheme in which a domestic union with children could not be dissolved until the
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C. The Principles Ignore the Impact of Dissolution Law
on the Survival of Marriages
What these proposals feature—and the ALI Principles disregard—is a focus on the marriage whose dissolution is at issue. The
ALI assumes that divorce law can have no impact upon the continued existence of the marriage.154 The Principles decline to address
the clear legal signaling that, after a generation of no-fault divorce,
“marriage is a transitory commitment, one that is easily set aside.”155
Indeed, the ALI begins with the premise of dissolution, oblivious to
the channelling and hortatory functions of law.156 Interested only in
fairly apportioning the consequences of the domestic breakup, the
Principles also administer a coup de grace to the notion that the state
has a stake in preserving marriage, or even “any litigable interest in
divorce.”157 In a sense, this critique of the Principles is directed not at
the text, but at the subtext; not at the terms of engagement with dissolution law, but at the ALI’s disengagement with the effort to consider the deterrent effect of its dissolution provisions.
This criticism is, perhaps, more properly focused on the ALI decision to tailor the Principles narrowly so as to sidestep any consideration of the grounds for divorce, despite the Chief Reporter’s claim
that the Principles would present a “comprehensive examination of
dissolution law.”158 The final position of the ALI Principles to avoid
children were emancipated).
154. See Scott, supra note 144, at 21 (observing that courts interpret no-fault divorce to
mean that “no barrier should seriously hinder a decision at any time by either party that the
marriage should end”).
155. Scott, supra note 12, at 1903. On the application of market signaling theory to the
norms of marriage, see id. at 1902–03; Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriage as a Signal, in THE
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 245 (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT]; Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms,
in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 256, 259–62; William Bishop, ‘Is He
Married?’: Marriage as Information, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 245 (1984).
156. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 495, 496 (1992) (noting that “in the channelling function the law recruits, builds,
shapes, sustains, and promotes social institutions”); Woodhouse, supra note 137, at 2526
(identifying “a dual function of family law, both as a mechanism for meeting the needs of family members and as a vehicle for expressing our values and aspirations about family life to ourselves and to our children”).
157. Sheldon, supra note 93, at 29.
158. Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 137, at 776. Ellman has been described as being
“particularly vehement about the restoration of fault to divorce proceedings for any purpose.”
Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage, supra note 145, at 81 n.80. Spaht has maintained that
Ellman’s “strong aversion to fault explains why the American Law Institute’s project, Principles
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any challenge to the dominant no-fault ideology was apparently
achieved after some turbulence. Chief Reporter Ellman acknowledged that the decision to disallow consideration of fault was initially
obtained by a “divided vote” of the Institute’s Council, and that the
subsequent draft enshrining the Principles’ no-fault treatment was
provisionally approved by the membership of the ALI in 1996 “after
defeat of two separate motions to restore consideration of fault.”159
D. Ignoring Marital Fault Has Some Redeeming Virtues
By contrast, another wing of the legal academy “challenges the
assumption that no-fault divorce . . . signaled a retreat from either a
moral vision or moral discourse in family law,”160 and contends instead that “fault-based proposals ultimately are destructive and counterproductive to divorcing individuals and families.”161 According to
this view, the cultural meanings of marriage and marital failure are
too complex to yield easily to the universal solvents of culpability or
enforced delay. Historically, fault has not functioned as an effective
barrier to divorce,162 nor have extended waiting periods succeeded in
diverting divorce or in improving marriage.163 That the views of
these opponents of the divorce counterrevolution are in the ascendancy in the ALI may be shown by the absence of the issue from the
of the Law of Family Dissolution, does not include fault as a relevant factor for purposes of
marital property distribution or compensation payments at divorce.” Id. Ellman has indeed
consistently argued the inappropriateness of applying fault norms to the dissolution process.
See Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, and Why Reformers
Should Look Instead to the American Law Institute, 11 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 216 (1997)
[hereinafter Ellman, Misguided Movement]; Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 719; see generally Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 137.
159. Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 137, at 776.
160. Murphy, supra note 7, at 1115.
161. Jane Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform Proposals, Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611, 611 (1999). See generally
Ellman & Lohr, supra note 158.
162. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before NoFault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (2000).
163. See DiFonzo, supra note 138, at 945–49; see also Ellman, Misguided Movement, supra note 158, at 225 (footnote omitted) (“I am skeptical that very many people now casually
destroy their happy marriages, or that the introduction of prolonged waiting periods would be
likely to preserve many unhappy ones. Its effect will rather be to increase the number of marriages that are, at any given time, legally intact but factually dead, to keep many victims of
failed marriages from building new lives for themselves and their children, and perhaps to increase the proportion of children born out of wedlock.”)
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text of the Principles.
At bottom, the ALI Principles’ refusal to countenance a role for
proposals to limit divorce serves to cement the no-fault revolution
and to further the consolidation of family law that is the ALI’s larger
theme.164 The elimination of culpability concerns advances the new
theoretical unification by markedly reducing the discretionary power
of trial judges. Traditionally, ascertaining the contours of relevant
marital misconduct was an exercise wild with discretion.165 Thwarting the revival of fault and the other steps intended to delay or deny
dissolution results in a less trammeled path for the application of the
substantive rules at play in the Principles, such as those relating to
the allotment of child support as well as of custodial and decisionmaking responsibility, the allocation of the economic repercussions
of dissolution, the encouragement of marriage-like domestic unions,
and the liberal allowance of domestic agreements. Introducing issues
of fault, whether marital or quasi-marital, could seriously distort the
impact of the Principles’ substantive rules in all these areas. The same
concern with culpability that symbolizes a barricade for those intending to deter divorce would operate as an escape hatch for those seeking equitable release from the ALI’s new rules. Thus, the denial of
culpability’s relevance to dissolution critically serves to reinforce the
conceptual integrity of the ALI Principles. Given the historical failure
of marital fault as a screen for rational divorce, the ALI position appears justified on policy grounds as well.
V. CONCLUSION
It is too early to tell whether we are on the verge of a unified
field theory of the family. Even so, the goal of theoretical consolidation has received a powerful boost by the ALI Family Dissolution
Principles. This article has focused on three key aspects of the effort
to streamline the dissolution process and amalgamate the various
elements of family law. First, in moving the legal system closer to ac164. The Proposed Final Draft notes that “the position taken by the Principles on this
question [excluding consideration of marital fault] follows from both the goal of improving the
consistency and predictability of dissolution law, and the core tenet that the dissolution law
provides compensation for only the financial losses arising from the dissolution of marriage.”
PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 14.
165. See Friedman, supra note 162, at nn.25, 57 & 130; Biondi, supra note 161, at 611
(footnote omitted) (noting that “fault-based divorce laws ultimately rely on inconsistent and
subjective family court judges to define fault”).
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cepting a functional definition of parenthood, the Principles aim to
eliminate the current jurisprudential dissonance caused by the frequent—but far from invariable—resort to inventive equitable doctrines in the effort to achieve coherence in nonbiological parent-child
relations. Second, by coming within striking distance of full integration of alimony and property division in a global financial calculus,
the ALI has served notice that legal doctrine will follow legal practice
in adopting a unified approach to post-dissolution economics. Finally, by marshaling the considerable powers of the ALI in opposition to the divorce counterrevolution, the Principles declare the second death of marital fault as a limitation upon the freedom to
divorce. In each of these aspects, as in the unified whole, the role of
judicial discretion has been reduced. The latitude traditionally accorded courts has yielded, in the ALI reconstruction of family law,
to a more schematic reliance on substantive standards.
The interlocking nature of the ALI Principles provides the
strength of a coherent whole, but it also exposes a potential weakness. Hitherto, state legislatures and courts generally could pick and
choose their preferred selections from the legal banquets served up
by the American Law Institute. The logical interdependency of the
provisions of the Family Dissolution Principles may make selective
adoption extremely difficult.166 Whether their solid-state wiring will
make the Principles more broadly accepted or widely ignored will be
revealed in time. In any case, the ALI’s faithfulness to the evolving
realities of American family life suggests that the emerging legal rules
will continue in the direction put forward by these Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution.

166. See Sheldon, supra note 93, at 23 (noting that “there is a formidable, logical framework behind the Principles that makes it impossible to accept some portions of it and reject
others”); Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and Custody: Importing the American Law Institute’s Principles of The Law of Family Dissolution into Oregon Law, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
643, 645 (1999) (“Adopting the Principles in their entirety would be a large systemic change
in most states . . . .”).

959

3DIFON.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

960

12/5/01 1:05 AM

[2001

